On the basis of Robert Putnam's two-level-game it is assumed that the Iranian anti-Western rhetoric is not primarily directed against the West, but instead towards a domestic audience in order to close the ranks behind the regime. Against this background, the Islamic Republic is constructed as a regional power in terms of Regional Security Complex Theory which is indeed capable and willing to act on behalf of Realpolitik and not only on ideological premises; the aim is to assess its securitizations in four different policy sectors using securitization theory and gain insights as how to mitigate those securitizations by the West. It is argued that -under certain circumstances -it may be possible to come to a limited regional security cooperation which could eventually lead in the end to a security architecture in the whole Middle East. Therefore the RSCT-model is used as a theoretical as well as a methodological tool which incorporates both ideational and structural levels of analysis providing a comprehensive view of threat perceptions and opportunities of cooperation.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to evaluate possible scope of action for Western Governments 105 to search for and identify possibilities for de-securitization of certain policy fields in Iranian politics. This is done by a) using the framework of the two-level-game introduced by Robert
Putnam (Putnam 1988) to demonstrate the gap between Iranian rhetoric and actual (foreign) policy and b) constructing Iran as a regional power within the Middle East using the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) provided by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (Buzan/Waever 2003) in order to assess Iranian securitizations and possible chances for de-securitization which, in turn, could lead to more readiness to engage in negotiations on both sides.
This paper argues that Iranian foreign policy rhetoric in its most extreme form, namely the anti-American and anti-Israeli propaganda, is not only directed against the West and Israel, but a) towards the domestic audience and b) towards a wider international audience within critics of Western universalism and Western dominance, known under the label "Third-Worldism".
Especially anti-Israeli propaganda is part of Iranian raison d'être and thus ideologically motivated; therefore it is important to distinguish it from rhetoric about actual policy.
Due to the methodological approach, which focuses on threat perceptions and vulnerabilities deriving thereof, the paper will try to take the Iranian Republic's view on security matters in order to assess their threat perceptions and vulnerabilities and therefore identify Iranian securitization interests 106 .
The two levels of Iranian rhetoric
Grounded in the self-definition as a "revolutionary state" it has been the aim of the regime to co-opt and spearhead revolutionary and anti-Western movements and governments around the world, not just Islamist ones but anti-Western governments in general, and it is state doctrine to balance Western spheres of influence wherever possible. To demonstrate these 105 Speaking of "Western Governments" in this paper generally means the European Union and the USA; this is to be differentiated from the P5+1, which is the official international negotiating program with Iran and consists of the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany. 106 Cf. Andreas Bock 2014: 119 -120: "The ultimate deciding factor is how the relevant key players perceive and judge the intentions of the threatening state (or alliance), a perception which is strongly influenced (but not determined) by an image already formed." Bock shows convincingly that not real or intended threats matter to decision makers, but only perceived threats.
ambitions and to underline the differences the Islamic Republic has in comparison to Western systems, it has been the aim of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) since the inception in 1979
to present the IRI as a reverse image of Western systems, which are described as decadent, imperialist and spiritually superficial, relying only on capitalism and political oppression to exploit third-world-nations (Posch 2013: 14) . The republic's founding father Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini wanted to distance the new system especially from its predecessor, the Shahregime, which was dependent on and a de-facto-colony of the USA, situating the new republic with a strong anti-imperialist impetus. In the first ten years of its existence Iran was in a constant state of exception because of the Western backed invasion of Iraqi forces into
Iranian territory in order to destabilise and eventually overthrow the regime; it was in that times when the Islamic Republic undoubtedly was a "revolutionary state", overtly supporting terrorist organizations both in the Middle East and in Western states, trying to destabilise the whole region and acting anything than pragmatic but only on ideological premises.
With the ending of the war and the death of the revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, the politics changed dramatically into a more pragmatic direction as the imperative was now to rebuild the country and to draw foreign investments into it. Therefore ideological ambitions have been abandoned and more pragmatic politics conducted as Telhami et. al. (Telhami and Barnett 2002: 109) .
From this moment forth rhetoric and action drifted apart more and more as the newly appointed revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stuck to the old rhetoric while President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989 Rafsanjani ( -1997 (Perthes 2010: 98) . This shows indeed the ability of Iran's government to act on behalf of its own national interest in a remarkable pragmatic way, without almost any restrictions posed by its official rhetoric and state ideology.
The only case where rhetoric and politics are entirely convergent is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which is a highly ideological "matter of faith" (Reissner 2001: 70) for the Iranian government as this rhetorical field constitutes an ideological yardstick for the confession of faith to the regime. All this shows the yawning gap between the revolutionary rhetoric and the actual policy.
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For various reasons this rapprochement did not have any real impact; first of all was the election of George Bush jr. and the events of 9/11 that intensified rhetoric on the other side, depicting Iran as part of an "axis of evil" and a rogue state.
Theory: Iran as a regional power Regional Security Complex Theory
Situating Iran as a main regional power within the Regional Seurity Complex (RSC) "Middle East" using the theoretical tool Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) as provided by Buzan/Waever is a primary aim of this paper. Therefore in the following paragraph the theory will be paraphrased and applied to Iran. (Buzan and Waever 2003: 47) .
These RSC's usually are mostly identical with geographical borders, although they are socially constructed entities. For this purpose it is crucial not only to analyse the degree of security interdependence by material effects and predispositions but also by "patterns of amity and enmity among the units in the system, which makes regional systems dependent on the actions and interpretations of actors" (ibid.: 40) .
In this way it is possible to analyse every region through the lens of securitizations and underlying security issues that can rely on material effects and capabilities as well as on ideational effects such as identity problems or patterns of amity and enmity as posited by the constructivist school of International Relations
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. Such a security complex consists of four structural elements which are a) a boundary which clearly distinguishes it from its neighbouring RSC's b) an anarchic structure, which means that the RSC is composed of two or and thus influences the distribution of power significantly; it is to be differentiated from "overlapping", which means that the units of the system don't have own interests at all but only interests imposed from an outside power. The Middle East is a prime example not only of a penetrated system in the common sense but also in the narrower meaning of a penetrated RSC.
For a successful process of securitization there are three necessary types of units, according
to Buzan et. al. 1998: "A referent object, whose survival is perceived as inherently endangered and has a legitimate claim to survive, a securitizing actor, who declares a certain referent object as being existentially threatened -thus making a securitizing move and functional actors:
Actors who affect the dynamics of a sector without being the referent object, nor the securitizing actor, but who significantly influences decisions in the field of security." (Buzan et. al. 1998: 36 . Emphasis in original).
Furthermore with their wider conception of security, not only encompassing the military and political sector as in classical security studies, it is possible to securitize almost any referent object in any societal sector, be it, e.g. the environment endangered by pollution; be it the national identity, endangered by immigration; be it the national economy (big banks), endangered by the global economic crisis. The necessary and sufficient predispositions for such a securitizing move are a) the social capital of the securitizing actor, i.e. does he have sufficient legitimacy to do so? and b) an audience which agrees upon the need of securitization of some referent object. This leads to another important point, the notion of intersubjective and social construction of securitization:
"Does a referent object hold general legitimacy as something that should survive, which entails that actors can make reference to it, point to something as a threat, and thereby get others to follow or at least tolerate actions not otherwise legitimate?" (ibid.: 31.
Emphasis in original)
No actor decides alone if a certain object is to be securitized; he does so by making a "speech act" referring to a certain object and speaking to a certain audience. The speech act can only be successful if two main conditions are met, which are: The social capital of the enunciator, who has to have a certain degree of authority over the subject (not everyone can securitize any object with the same degree of legitimacy) and the conjuration of a security threat that is posited by something dangerous (some things are easier to be constructed as a danger, i.e.
tanks on borders or masses of refugees). Thirdly there has to be an audience which accepts this claim made in the securitizing move (ibid.: 31 -33). Furthermore, extraordinary measures have to be accepted in defence of the referent object, not legitimate in situations of "normal"
politics to make it a securitization.
The security complex "Middle East"
The RSC Middle East is one of the most complicated complexes as it consists of a relatively high number of states (approximately 20) with a relatively high degree of polarity which means there are two overarching actors as, who compete on a regional as well as a global level. There is a rising polarity between Saudi-Arabia and Iran on the Sunni-Shi'a division lines, who compete for regional dominance on various political sectors, such as militarily but also ideologically. Because of its vast size, this complex is divided into three sub-complexes which are two main ones in its centre, the Levant and the Persian Gulf and one at the periphery the (Buzan and Waever 2003: 217 f.) It is a mixture of many common features which unify the states of the RSC on the one hand, Significant for this paper is the subcomplex "Persian Gulf " as both Iran and Saudi-Arabia are the major rivals within this subcomplex along several lines of division where Iraq, as an ethnically as well as religiously divided country, is one of the main battlegrounds for hegemony for both of them. The task is to analyse the subcomplex and its actors on the basis of five sectors as provided by Buzan et. al. 1998 ; they propose analysis of securitizations in each of five sectors, namely the military, the political, the environmental, the societal, and the economic sector.
What follows is a short description of each sector, which possible referent objects it may incorporate and why it is used in this analysis or why it is not.
The most obvious sector for securitizations and security studies is the military sector; within which we find typical fields and objects of reference of classical power politics and security studies. Referent objects may include territorial integrity, Buzan et. al. explicitly mention religion as a referent object for the military sector and -deriving thereof -"Western fears of
Islam, the rise of Hindu-nationalism, and theories about the 'clash of civilizations'". (Buzan et. al: 53) . But dangers that threaten the survival of the state may not only occur from outside, it may also have to struggle with domestic challenges like secessionists, revolutionaries and all kinds of rebels that question the authority of the current government, as well as organised crime and militias that take the right in their own hand, because they doubt the capacity of the government to deal with certain challenges. The securitizing actor usually is -at least in modern nation-states -the government which is in charge of the military (ibid.: 52-55).
The second sector of analysis is the environmental sector which for our purpose can be neglected because as Buzan et. al. put it, here the civilization or the "human enterprise" (ibid.: 76) as a whole serves as referent object, either in a scenario of a nuclear war or a post-environmental apocalypse or as a degrading level of civilization itself. It could also be the water from a river like the Jordan in Israel/Jordan or the Nile in Egypt/Sudan which can be securitized. In the case of Iran there is no such case that justifies the analysis of the environmental sector (ibid.:
Chapter 4).
The third sector to be analysed is the economic sector; as referent objects come into question state interests such as political status (e.g. a declining hegemon), political leverage (oil for example) or military capability. These examples seem to belong either to the military or the political sector but since the measures taken lie within the economic sector, they are to be analysed within this context (ibid.: 102). In the last years Europe and the USA have witnessed that it is even possible to securitize a single firm, namely banks that are "too big to fail" and need to be rescued by the state because their survival is essential for the economy of the whole state. This would clearly be a case of securitization in the economic sector.
Fourth it is the societal sector, which includes ideas and practices such as identity, an underlying self-conception, and in some cases religion; these referent objects transcend the political horizon as they do not stop on national borders but encompass social groups and phenomena that are "occurring at both smaller and larger scales and sometimes even transcending the spatial dimension altogether" (ibid.: 119). The authors here refer explicitly to communities with one given identity as referent objects and not only to nations; this may entail supranational groups such as the Kurds as well as sub-national groups such as the Assyrians in Iraq. Typically societal securitization involves fears of immigration or more specifically of "overriding cultural and linguistic influence […] e.g., Canadian fears of Americanization" (ibid.: 121) or secessionist movements such as Catalonia in Spain. Persian resentments against Arab domination fall into this sector, too, or more generally, fears of Western cultural dominance.
The last sector of analysis is the political sector. The typical referent object of this sector is the nation state, although it may also encompass supranational entities such as the European
Union or "transnational movements that are able to mobilize supreme allegiance from adherents" (ibid.: 145), such as the Catholic Church in medieval times or ideological movements such as Pan-Arabism or Communism. Usually it will be the government of a state that is the legitimate securitizing actor or in the case of movements the recognised leader of the movement, such as the Pope in medieval times or any leader of a movement with sufficient authority and adherents to declare anything as a referent object. Vulnerabilities usually encompass ideas such as nationalism or any political ideology, because when these are threatened often the stability of the whole political order is challenged. Usually it is the domestic legitimacy which is put into question or to be weakened by external hostile actors (ibid.: Chapter 7). The more a state relies on any state ideology the more it is vulnerable in this sector.
After having analysed the subcomplex and its interrelations among the actors on the basis of these sectors, we should be able to identify referent objects of securitization for Iran and hence possibilities for de-securitization to give policy advices to Western governments in which sectors negotiations promise the most positive outcome.
Analysis The Subcomplex Persian Gulf -Data and Facts
The subcomplex Persian Gulf consists of Iran, Iraq, and the states of the Arabian Peninsula, and take the Syrian civil war on a different agenda as it is much more complex. On this agenda there will be much less room for cooperation as the West and Iran have diametrically opposing goals and interests. So the battle against ISIS can serve as a trust building means during the rapprochement and the differences should be cast aside as long as there's a common enemy.
This may seem naïve in the eyes of some hardcore realist analysts (cf.: Weiss and Pregent
2015)
111 which see gains of Iran as losses of the USA in the Iraqi and Syrian battlefield but within a coherent realist-constructivist framework, which tries also to incorporate the Iranian government's point of view, one cannot but come to the conclusion that there are to expect far more gains in cooperation than losses as cooperation would force the Iranian government to act more responsibly and give it an opportunity to ease its rhetoric. A common enemy therefore is one of the best starting points for the building of mutual trust. Apart from that, there will be no solution in the Syrian civil war without a proper engagement of Iran, either in negotiations with the Assad-Regime, or by direct negotiations with Iran. The situation is far more complicated since the Russian intervention allegedly against ISIS, but in fact against all groups fighting against the regime.
Another securitization interest within the military sector is the massive presence of American troops along the Iranian borders as well as in the Persian Gulf; even if one subtracts the bases 111 I will not go into detail why the line of argumentation is this article is at least in parts wrong, but one must not confuse cause and effect in the ongoing civil war between Sunni and Shiite sects and the USbacked government of Prime Minister Maliki has done everything to escalate this conflict and the subsequent rising of ISIS. de-securitization on this topic seems much more difficult as it is not possible for the USgovernment to withdraw these troops in the near future as Iran wishes; the only way Iranian fears could be further lessened would be more means of building mutual trust which could be achieved in the political sector, i.e. the recognition of the regime as it is. This will be analysed in the next paragraph.
The political sector
Regarding ideological vulnerabilities within the political sector, the Iranian government has several securitization interests, because, (Buzan et. al. 153 ).
This describes perfectly the Iranian stance towards the present international order in which it doesn't want to integrate wholly but at least only partially; it does not fully fit within the Western created international order, neither politically nor economically. On the contrary, the regime constantly tries to challenge that order -at least rhetorically -with its emphasis on Third-Worldism (Posch 2013: 22) and therefore isolates itself from the world community.
According to Buzan et. al. these states are more vulnerable to political securitization and Iran is no exception; the main referent object of the securitizing move is the Islamic Republic itself 112 Cf. http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-ofaction_en.pdf and thus the regime. Since its inception the Islamic Republic feels threatened in its very existence and continues to do so, especially -and paradoxically -after the overthrow of the Saddam regime, because on the one hand, the Iranian regime has gained the most of the revolution in Iraq but on the other hand it is now encircled by US-troops and the only remaining ideologically hostile regime to the USA in the Middle East, making it the prime target for regime change. The only option to immunise itself from that constant danger -in Iranian views -is to be at least a "virtual nuclear power", i.e. to have the potential to build a nuclear warhead without explicitly possessing one (Posch 2013: 23f.) . These ambitions are rendered by a discourse Walter Posch calls "nuclear justice" and Homeira Moshirzadeh sets into a broader context when she aptly notes that there are "two main meta-discourses that give meaning to Iranian foreign policy in general and its nuclear policy in particular: the discourse of independence and the discourse of justice" 2007: 529; Bock 2014: 122 -124) . This explains the strong emphasis on independence; never again shall Iran be dependent on foreign powers and the safest way to achieve that independence is to make Iran as strong and powerful as possible. Here are also great possibilities to at least ease these securitizations; if the West is willing to accept and to take serious those sentiments and above all give the Iranian government the feeling that it has not to fear a regime change, much would be done in this respect. Of course, this is no one way road and
Iran also has to "tone down its anti-Americanism and speak directly to the United States" (Posch 2013: 30) . After all, Iran wants to be treated as an equal under equals and is desperately looking for full recognition as a regional power in its own right. When it will have achieved such a status it will eventually also ease its rhetoric or in other words:
"It is only through recognition of the country's rights on the basis of international principles, rules, and norms that Iran will see its dignity as an 'independent state' as being guaranteed." (Moshirzadeh 2007: 538 f.) .
This entails some right to nuclear energy of any kind whatsoever, the recognition of Iran as a main regional player and above all not to strengthen beliefs within the Iranian elite about any aggressive behaviour against Iran or a lack of respect in the negotiations with it. Furthermore, "recognition of the country's rights on the basis of international principles, rules, and norms" also entails to quit applying double standards by Western governments. The Iranian regime constantly feels discriminated when it is accused of violation of human rights and lack of democratic institutions -which is correct -but other regime's flaws in this direction, e.g.
Saudi-Arabia's, are generously overlooked. This amplifies suspicions within the Iranian polity that the normative rhetoric and demands from the West are nothing but that -rhetoric -and that the Iranian government can do little to mitigate these accusations. To ease these securitizations is no easy task for Western governments as the adoption of a coherent policy would be necessary in order to regain credibility in the field of norms and human rights irrespective of economic or political interests. At the end of the day, the West supports a system that forbids women to drive cars and is publicly beheading regime opponents and only rhetorically adhering to Western norms such as human rights and religious freedom. Moreover these states are overtly funding jihadist movements in Syria, like the Jabhat al-nusra (Ownes 2014; Walsh 2010), which Iran is also accused of. The task for Western governments would be to deal with Iran on the same non-ideological and pragmatic level as with other powers in the region. For this purpose, the preliminary agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme is a great leap forwards.
The economic sector
It is difficult to see any real securitizations within the economic sphere which do not also spill over to other sectors such as the political. As an example, the low oil price is a major threat to the Iranian economy and it is mostly caused by the Saudi government which displays a willingness to take chances on its own economy in order to damage the Iranian economy (Stephens 2014) . This is a securitization issue on the Iranian side, because the government may decide to take every means possible to get back to a higher crude oil price, as "Iran's economy is heavily reliant on hydrocarbons, which make up some 60% of its export revenue and provided 25% of total GDP in 2013" (ibid.). These numbers show how extremely vulnerable the Islamic Republic is with regard to oil and gas exports; the problem is that there is no short-ranged solution for the government, because it cannot simply increase its production of crude oil with the economic sanctions in the back. The only solution lies in the political sector where any kind of rapprochement has to be made with the Saudis to terminate this "Cold War" between the two regional powers and Michael Stephens sees some positive developments in that direction when he observes that "recent attempts by the Saudis to diplomatically engage their Iranian counterparts, particularly on regional security issues like Islamic State appear positive" (Stephens 2014) ; here again, a common enemy to fight against may help to overcome differences and maybe come to a longer lasting agreement in the region even beyond the fight against ISIS. A requirement would be that both Iran and Saudi-Arabia would not think in terms of a zero-sum game and balance-of-power logics, but rather in terms of "balance-of-security" as Kayhan Barzegar suggests (Barzegar 2010b) . But there's still a long way to go to overcome the deep mistrust between these two regional players, which will be discussed in the last section of conclusions.
The second major referent object is the national economy which is crippled by the sanctions imposed on Iran by the international community, and here, the solution lies clearly in the political sector and the negotiations with the P5+1. There is slight optimism about an eventual implementation of the nuclear agreement and thus a lifting of sanctions within the next year.
As a consequence the former securitization, the crude oil price, would be of a minor significance, as the Republic's economy would have the chance to recover on a more general level. It is one of Rouhani's major pre-election promises to mitigate the economic differences the Iranian Republic is facing, especially the extreme inflation. Also the revolutionary leader has expressed his good will about the ongoing implementation and the willingness to adhere to the conditions of the deal. The most important aspect until now is the currency of trust;
both sides have experienced that it is in fact possible to come to honest negotiations with one another and to reach a deal which satisfies both side's needs.
The societal sector
As the main securitization interests within the societal sector lie within identity and a "construction or reproduction of 'us'" (Buzan et. al. 1998: 120) So negotiations itself are a threat to the legitimacy of the government, at least when they implicit "any unbridled engagement with the West" (Ghahrenmanpour 2011: 67) ; from this 113 cf. graphic 2: "state identity vs. national identity".
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The West in general and the USA specifically are perceived of as the "other" in terms of identification processes; therefore it is a main concern to distance the IRI from that other, but coincidentally also get in contact with that other as there is no other way because it is the dominant form of politics and economics. 
Conclusions and policy recommendations
Based on the analysis of the four sectors in the section above, what follows will be a conclusion of the securitizations and based on that policy recommendations will be given in order to come to a more coherent policy regarding Iran.
The West in general and the USA specifically have to face some bitter truths regarding Iran and the Middle East if they want to build a stable security architecture in the region. First, Iran is to be recognised as one of two regional powers, as many Middle East scholars agree, with the other being Saudi-Arabia, an old "ally" of the West. But as the latter is neither able nor willing to permanently play a constructive role regarding the regional security as it has proven by sponsoring Wahhabi sectarianism around the world and Jihadi terrorists (Esfandiari and Tabatabai 2015: 12) and furthermore using its oil reserves as an economic weapon, not only against Iran but also against the United States, the West needs someone who is able to play a constructive role in such an undertaking. Not that the Islamic Republic is the perfect partner, but it is a capable and fitting one. And it is longing for an -at least partially -better integration into the international community and the lifting of the sanctions that are crippling its economy and heating the inflation. Therefore not a real "normalization" of relationships between the USA and Iran is necessary, but only a rapprochement based on a limited cooperation on a limited number of issues in order to gain mutual trust. (Crisis Group 2015) This entails significant concession by both sides and serious engagement in negotiations.
Western powers have to make clear to Tehran that its exclusive influence over a future government in Damascus will be less than what it had; and they themselves have to face the reality that there has to be a political agreement with which Tehran will be satisfied, too (Crisis Group 2015).
With the moderate president Hassan Rouhani and a "lame duck"
117 Obama, chances are better than ever to come to the situation where both governments see "the gains of cooperation on a positive-sum formula rather than sticking on zero-sum basis" as Kayhan Barzegar aptly suggests (Barzegar 2012: 20) . The same can be said about the relationship between Iran and Saudi-Arabia which nowadays is fashioned within a Hobbesian framework to use Alexander Wendt's notion, but has chances to move more towards a Lockean framework where the actors still are in a state of rivalry but not of enmity and focus on mutual gains rather than on relative gains (Wendt 2010: 264 -283) . For Kayhan Barzegar it even is "inevitable" that the Persian
Gulf moves from a Balance of Power system to a Balance of Security system, which would entail "greater regional cooperation and constructive rivalries" (Barzegar 2010b: 86) ; this claim seems a bit too optimistic about the future developments especially with regard to the relations with Saudi-Arabia, but there is reason to be slightly optimistic. In the end, both sides have to come to the conclusion that a stable security architecture will be more effective and less costly than mutual containment as this is an illusory goal on both sides.
Politically the Islamic Republic wants to be recognised as a member of aspiring countries like South Africa, Brazil or India and be treated like them. In this regard it is essential to strengthen the moderates in the Iranian government and the best way to do this is to grant them political achievements and successes; this would entail, as stated before, a nuclear deal and a lifting of the sanctions with an agreement that saves every side their faces. In case of a failure, as Hossein Bastani remarks, those "who favour interaction with the international community [...],will never be able to return to the sphere of foreign policy in Iran" (Bastani 2014: 15) resulting in the repeated ascent of hard-liners to the government and make Iran ever more resilient against pressure from outside as has been seen under the presidency of Ahmadinejad.
With an incremental lifting of the sanctions and concomitant economic recovery, President
Hassan Rouhani and his administration could effectively be strengthened and their credibility be proven, and thus the populist movement of Ahamdinejad, who recently returned to the political stage, be further discredited. Therefore it should be a main aim of Western politics to strengthen the moderate forces in Iran under president Rouhani in order that they gain credibility within their constituencies and are able to deliver on their promises. The hope is that after economic recovery within the next two years and a re-election of a moderate government, in the next legislature period, political and societal liberalisation may take place.
The responsiveness to such politics of the Iranian regime, again, seems better than the Supreme Leader's rhetoric proposes at first glance. When he still depicts the USA as a "Great Satan" this is part of some kind of a "division of labour" in which the Supreme Leader satisfies the ideological needs of the state identity and the (moderate) president acts on his behalf in day to day politics within the framework the Supreme Leader predetermines, as has been shown above with the two-level-game approach. As he tacitly approved of a slow liberalisation after the election of Rouhani, hopes are justified that after a recognition of the regime, its right to nuclear energy and a slow but steady economic recovery a likewise incremental political and societal liberalisation may take place, as the Islamic Republic will see the benefits of such an opening to the world.
